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Abstract. The manner in which US presidential elections are organized make 
them ripe for empirical manifestations of the “voting paradoxes” identified by 
social choice theorists.  This note illustrates the general point with polling data 
involving the two leading Democrats and the three leading Republicans at the 
beginning of the 2016 presidential primaries, suggesting that all five candidates 
may be alternatives in one or more cyclical majorities, i.e., where no candidate 
cannot be beaten by at least one other candidate. 
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Introduction 
 
The organization of the US presidential election process makes it an 
eminently suitable setting for the empirical occurrence of such so-
called “voting paradoxes” as those identified by social choice theory 
(e.g., Riker 1982; Nurmi 1999; Gehrlein 2006; Gehrlein and Lepelley 
2011). 
For both major parties, Democrats and Republicans, the process 
involves a form of plurality voting (although different forms at 
different stages), where the winner is the candidate with most votes 
but not necessarily an absolute majority.  The election process also 
includes sequential decisions (state by state in the primaries 
followed by a general election among the voters in all states).  Alone 
but especially together these features mean that in candidate fields 
with more than two alternatives it is possible to observe the 
selection of an alternative, A, that in reality could be beaten by 
another alternative, B, in a pairwise comparison between the two 
alone (the “Borda Paradox”).  There is even the theoretical 
possibility of a so-called cyclical majority (the “Condorcet 
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Paradox”), where no candidate cannot be beaten by at least one 
other candidate in pairwise comparison (A > B, B > C, but C > A).  
Furthermore, given that the voters voting in the individual 
primaries, as well as in the general election, are not identical sets of 
decision-makers, there is ripe possibility for inconsistent social 
choices even if the individual preferences are consistent and the 
individual stages unproblematic (cf. Brams, Kilgour and Zwicker 
1998; Kurrild-Klitgaard 2013). 
Since voters in US presidential elections usually have more than 
two alternatives to choose between, the selection of a president who 
might be beaten by one or more other candidates if compared in 
pairwise “head to head” match-ups would seem to be at least a 
theoretical possibility, and there are reasons to believe that this, or 
even “cyclical majorities” between three or more candidates may 
have occurred in some US presidential elections (Riker 1982; Riker 
1986; cf. Van Deemen 2014; Kurrild-Klitgaard 2014). 
 The present note is not meant as an in-depth, academic treatment 
of the topic but merely as a brief note using some simple polling 
averages from the beginning of the 2016 US primary election season 
to illustrate the empirical relevance of the perspective. 
 
 
Some simple polling averages 
 
On the evening of the first stage of the 2016 presidential elections, 
the Iowa Caucus, 1 February 2016, and about a week before the New 
Hampshire Primary, the leading candidates of the two major parties 
were (in terms of poll shares in national polls of the voters of the 
two parties): 
 
Democrats: 1) Hillary Clinton; 2) Bernard Sanders 
Republicans: 1) Donald Trump; 2) Ted Cruz; 3) Marco Rubio 
 
 3 
A look at the well-established polling averages found at the 
respected website RealClearPolitics.com1 produced the binary 
relations given in Table 1, where > indicates “beats” and where the 
percentages given are the polling averages, either from pair-wise 
comparisons (for the possible General Election candidate pairs) or 
from the comparisons of all-against-all in the national primary polls 
of the two parties.  Ideally only the former should be used, since 
there is no guarantee that candidate A will be beat candidate B in in 
pairwise comparisons just because candidate A leads candidate B in 
a field of +2 candidates.  However, there are—as we shall return 
to—very few head-to-head match-ups made among primary 
candidates and at least initially we shall have to rely on the national 
polls with all candidates. 
 
 
Table 1. General election head-to-head match ups and national primary polls, 
averages. 
Candidates Election polls 
Clinton (44.0%) > Trump (41.3%) General Election head-to-head match-up 
Clinton (51.6%) > Sanders (37.2%) National Primary, all candidates (Demo-
crats) 
Cruz (46.8%) > Clinton (45.5%) General Election head-to-head match-up 
Rubio (47.0%) > Clinton (44.5%) General Election head-to-head match-up 
Rubio (44.0%) > Sanders (43.0%) General Election head-to-head match-up 
Sanders (45.0%) > Cruz (41.7%) General Election head-to-head match-up 
Sanders (46.8%) > Trump (41.5%) General Election head-to-head match-up 
Trump (35.8%) > Cruz (19.6%) National Primary, all candidates (Republi-
cans) 
Trump (36.2%) > Rubio (10.2%) National Primary, all candidates (Republi-
cans) 
Source: RealClearPolitics.com (1 February 2016). 
 
 
                                           
1 RealClearPolitics’ polling averages are unweighted averages of the five most 
recent polls on a topic from different polling firms (so that no polling firm’s 
polls constitute more than 1/5 of the polls used). 
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Now, US voters are famously unfocused at the beginning of the 
primary season, but taking RealClearPolitics’ polling averages as 
given and representative for the US voting population, and 
assuming away all other candidates, etc., the results of Table 1 gives 
us (at least) three odd social orderings of the candidates 
summarized in Table 2.  
 
 
Table 2. Three quasi-cycles hypothesized on the basis of poll averages. 
Sanders > Trump > Rubio > Sanders 
Rubio > Clinton > Trump > Rubio 
Cruz > Clinton > Sanders > Cruz 
Source: See Table 1. 
 
 
These comparisons show three different sub-sets of the set of five 
candidates each involving three candidates finding themselves in a 
quasi-cycle with each other.  I call these “quasi-cycles” since they are 
not really based in actual choices made or preferences held by the 
same sets of voters at unique points in time. 
The results presented here should not be read in the way that “the 
voters” as a whole (necessarily) have collective preferences 
resembling the orderings—since, obviously, the voters voting in the 
Democratic primaries are not the same as those voting in the 
Republican primaries, and none of these two sets are identical, 
separately or jointly, with the voters of the general election. 
However, the orderings may be read as at least a distinct 
empirical possibility—and this despite the fact that we have 
included national primary polls and compared these with General 
Election head-to-head match-ups, given that pairwise comparisons 
are rarely made for primary contenders.  First of all, on the 
Democrats’ side there is not the same need for a pairwise 
comparison since at the date of writing (1 February 2016) Clinton 
held a +50% vote share among Democrats. 
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Secondly, there has—according to PollingReport.com—been one 
poll with head-to-head match-up among the top-three Republican 
contenders Cruz, Rubio and Trump (an NBC News/Wall Street 
Journal Poll conducted by Hart Research Associates and Public 
Opinion Strategies, 9-13 January 2016).  In this poll’s pairwise 
comparisons Cruz beat Trump 51%-43% while Trump beat Rubio 
52%-45%.  The former would be inconsistent with the assumption 
made here but would not affect the three quasi-cycles identified 
here, since none of them includes both Trump and Cruz. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
A look at the US presidential polls as they stood 1 February 2016 
suggest the following hypothetical scenarios: Should Sanders end 
up the 45th president of the US by beating Trump on Election Day in 
November, then he would likely have lost if Rubio had been his 
adversary.  Should Rubio be the winner by beating Clinton, then he 
might have lost to Trump.  And should Cruz be the new president 
by trumping Clinton, then he might plausibly have lost to Sanders. 
In this way the polling averages demonstrate the potentially 
instability of social choices, and that this is not just a theoretical 
phenomenon but a genuine empirical possibility. 
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